Two Complementary Methods for Studying Complex Social Systems: Simulation and Game Theory

doi:10.16182/j.issn1004731x.joss.19-0513

Abstract

Abstract: Alongside with scientific experiments and theoretic research, scientific computation is the third paradigm for studying our world. Modelling and simulation method is a main technique of scientific computation, focusing on resulting in a suitable model for the research subject. Game theory is a natural choice for modelling intelligent interactions among multiple decision makers, which can provide accurate interaction model for the simulation of complex systems. This paper investigates the application of game theory in military operation simulation and social system simulation. Bottlenecks of the use of game theory in these simulations are pointed out and some future research directions are proposed. Meanwhile, the applications of simulation method in obtaining model inputs of complex game theoretic model and deducing game evolution results are discussed.

Key words: Modelling and Simulation, Game Theory, Complex System, Intelligent Interaction

CLC Number:

TP391.9

Zhang Laobing, Ruan Qiming, Qiu Xiaogang. Two Complementary Methods for Studying Complex Social Systems: Simulation and Game Theory[J]. Journal of System Simulation, 2019, 31(10): 1960-1969.

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