Simulation of the Market Exclusive Competition between Platforms

doi:10.16182/j.issn1004731x.joss.21-0408

Abstract

Abstract:

As for the problem of an exclusive competition between the platforms, 2 competing PlatformsAgent, 100 ConsumersAgent and 300 SellersAgent are introduced and encapsulated into a closed market environment in BarriersModelSwarm. A two-sided market system is constructed with the cross-network externality. Through BarriersObserverSwarm, the Agents attribute information and behavior strategy are cross-called, and the virtual connection class Orderand ArrayList class in the Virtual Connection Classes are generated to run cyclically. The unilateral dependence degree of Consumers/SellersAgent is triggered, which restores the exclusive of the two-sided market competition in comparison with the platform transaction scale, market concentration, and platform cumulative capital.Simulation results show that the increasing dependence of Consumers/SellersAgent forms the cumulative advantage, which influences the evolution of the exclusive competition between the PlatformsAgent.Exploring the evolutionary and emergence of the exclusive competition in a two-sided market has prospectively holistic value in a two-sided market supervision.

Key words: two platforms, unilateral dependency, exclusive competition, Swarm simulation, two-sided market

CLC Number:

Wen Zheng, Zhe Zhang, Jingyi Zhu. Simulation of the Market Exclusive Competition between Platforms[J]. Journal of System Simulation, 2022, 34(09): 2098-2106.

Figures/Tables 11

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Fig. 9

Fig. 10

Fig. 11

References 16

[1]	国家市场监督管理总局. 行政处罚决定书(国市监处[2021]28号)[EB/OL]. (2021-04-10)[2021-04-30]. .
	State Administration of Market Supervision. Decision on Administrative Penalty (National and Municipal Supervision Office[2021] No.28)[EB/OL]. (2021-04-10)[2021-04-30]. .
[2]	Rochet J C, Tirole J. Platform Competition in Two-sided Markets[J]. Journal of the European Economic Association (S1542-4766), 2003, 1(4): 990-1029.
[3]	Armstrong M, Wright J. Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts[J]. Economic Theory (S0938-2259), 2007, 32(2): 353-380.
[4]	郑文, 李亚鹏. 市场的双边结构仿真[M]. 北京: 科学出版社, 2018.
	Zheng Wen, Li Yapeng. Simulation of Bilateral Market Structure[M]. Beijing: Science Press, 2018.
[5]	Pongou R, Serrano R. Volume of Trade and Dynamic Network Formation in Two-sided Economies[J]. Ssrn Electronic Journal (S0717-3458), 2013, 63: 147-163.
[6]	胡滨, 杨涛, 程炼, 等. 大型互联网平台的特征与监管[J]. 金融评论, 2021, 13(3): 101-122,126.
	Hu Bin, Yang Tao, Cheng Lian, et al. Characteristics and Regulation of Big Techs[J]. Chinese Review of Financial Studies, 2021, 13(3): 101-122,126.
[7]	Muzellec L, Ronteau S, Lambkin M. Two-sided Internet Platforms: A Business Model Lifecycle Perspective[J].Industrial Marketing Management (S0019-8501), 2015, 45(1): 139-150.
[8]	郑文, 窦晨希, 张喆. 外卖平台专送式利益分配仿真[J].系统仿真学报, 2021, 33(3): 631-644.
	Zheng Wen, Dou Chenxi, Zhang Zhe. Simulation of Benefit Distribution in Platform Delivery Mode[J].Journal of System Simulation, 2021, 33(3): 631-644.
[9]	郑翔, 山茂峰. 互联网平台经营者市场支配地位的认定——基于平台数据竞争的反思[J]. 北京交通大学学报 (社会科学版), 2021, 20(3): 148-154.
	Zheng Xiang, Shan Maofeng. Determination of Market Dominance of Internet Platform Operators: Reflectionon Platform Data Competition[J]. Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University (Social Sciences Edition), 2021, 20(3): 148-154.
[10]	唐要家, 杨越. 双边市场平台独占交易协议的反竞争效应[J]. 首都经济贸易大学学报, 2020, 22(4): 62-69.
	Tang Yaojia, Yang Yue. Anti-competitive Effects of Exclusive Contracts by Platforms in Two-sided Markets[J]. Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business, 2020, 22(4): 62-69.
[11]	Stenbacka R, Takalo T. Switching Costs and Financial Stability[J]. Journal of Financial Stability (S1572-3089), 2019, 41(1): 14-24.
[12]	陶爱萍, 程小芳, 张淑安. 技术标准锁定与开源开放：一个文献综述[J]. 合肥工业大学学报 (社会科学版), 2020, 34(2): 1-6.
	Tao Aiping, Cheng Xiaofang, Zhang Shu'an. Technical Standard Lock-in and Open Source and Openness: A Literature Review[J]. Journal of Hefei University of Technology (Social Sciences), 2020, 34(2): 1-6.
[13]	郑文, 马莹莹. 市场利益分配模型与仿真实验设计[M].北京: 科学出版社, 2017.
	Zheng Wen, Ma Yingying. Market Profit Distribution Model and Simulation Experiment Design[M]. Beijing: Science Press, 2017.
[14]	郑文, 李亚鹏, 马莹莹. 考虑价格偏好的交易连接强度仿真[J]. 系统仿真学报, 2018, 30(10): 3883-3892.
	Zheng Wen, Li Yapeng, Ma Yingying. Simulation on Transaction Connection Strength Considering Price Preference[J]. Journal of System Simulation, 2018, 30(10): 3883-3892.
[15]	Top S, Dilek S. Competition Between Networks[J].Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences (S1877-0428), 2011, 3(24): 1585-1595.
[16]	周彦莉, 赵炳新. 消费者视角的市场锁定现象机理与模拟[J]. 系统管理学报, 2017, 26(1): 63-70.
	Zhou Yanli, Zhao Bingxin. Mechanism and Simulation Study on Market Lock-in Phenomenon from the Consumer Perspective[J]. Journal of System &Management, 2017, 26(1): 63-70.