系统仿真学报 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 2252-2260.doi: 10.16182/j.issn1004731x.joss.20-0408

• 国民经济仿真 • 上一篇    下一篇

进口国规制下医药产品出口安全监管演化仿真

李小莉1, 曹策俊2,*, 张帆顺3   

  1. 1.仲恺农业工程学院 管理学院,广东 广州 510225;
    2.重庆工商大学 管理科学与工程学院,重庆 400067;
    3.暨南大学 管理学院,广东 广州 510632
  • 收稿日期:2020-06-25 修回日期:2020-08-03 出版日期:2021-09-18 发布日期:2021-09-17
  • 通讯作者: 曹策俊(1990-),男,博士,副教授,硕士生导师,研究方向为灾害运作管理等。E-mail:caocejun0601@tju.edu.cn
  • 作者简介:李小莉(1988-),女,博士,讲师,研究方向为应急管理等。E-mail:lixiaoli@zhku.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金(71904021); 广东省教育厅青年人才创新项目(KA190578813); 重庆市社会科学规划项目(2019QNGL27); 重庆自然科学基金(cstc2020jcyj-msxmX0164); 教育部‘春晖计划'合作科研项目(CQ2019001); 重庆工商大学“应对重大突发公共卫生事件”专题研究重点项目(ctbuyqzx01); 重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJQN201900830); 重庆工商大学校内科研项目(1951025); 重庆工商大学引进高层次人才科研启动项目(1955011)

Evolutionary Simulation of Medical Products Export Safety Supervision Considering Regulation of Importing Country

Li Xiaoli1, Cao Cejun2,*, Zhang Fanshun3   

  1. 1. School of Management, Zhongkai University of Agriculture and Engineering, Guangzhou 510225, China;
    2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China;
    3. School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China
  • Received:2020-06-25 Revised:2020-08-03 Online:2021-09-18 Published:2021-09-17

摘要: 为研究疫情背景下进口国规制对医药产品出口安全监管的影响,构建了考虑进口国规制的医药产品出口企业与政府监管部门的演化博弈模型,并利用MATLAB仿真,分析了进口国规制程度、惩罚机制等因素对医药产品出口安全监管过程的影响。研究表明,当进口国规制程度高于某一阈值时,可有效约束医药产品出口企业的违规行为,但也会助长政府部门消极监管的行为;从长远来看,单纯加大对医药产品出口企业或政府监管部门的惩罚力度,并不能有效遏制企业的违规行为。

关键词: 新冠病毒, 医药产品, 出口安全, 进口国规制, 政府监管, 演化博弈

Abstract: In order to investigate the impacts of the regulation of importing country on export safety supervision regarding medical products in the COVID-19 epidemic situation, an evolutionary game model considering the relation between export enterprise and supervision of government is constructed. Based on MATLAB simulation, the influences of different factors including regulation level of importing country, punishment mechanism on export safety supervision of medical products are analyzed. Results show that the illegal behaviors of the export enterprises of medical products can be restrained when the regulation level of importing country reaches a certain threshold. But that would fuel the passively supervision behaviors of government. From a long-term perspective, the illegal behaviors of enterprises cannot be effectively controlled by only increasing the level of the penalties on medical exporter or government regulator.

Key words: COVID-19, medical products, export safety, regulation of importing country, government regulation, evolutionary game

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